A Brief Comment on the Response By Professors Findley and Risinger to My Original Contribution to Professor Risinger’s Symposium by Imwinkelried, Edward J.
IMWINKELRIEDRESPONSE (DO NOT DELETE) 8/10/2018 9:05 AM 
 
1229 
A Brief Comment on the Response By Professors 
Findley and Risinger to My Original Contribution to 
Professor Risinger’s Symposium 
Edward J. Imwinkelried* 
I.THE MICROCOSM ISSUE: SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME (SBS) ........ 1229 
A.  Support for SBS ............................................................ 1232 
B.  Opposition to SBS ........................................................ 1233 




I. THE MICROCOSM ISSUE: SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME (SBS) 
The primary focus of my Symposium Article is not Shaken Baby 
Syndrome (SBS).  The Article comments on a wide range of types of expert 
testimony; it uses examples relating to DNA typing, microscopic hair 
analysis, comparative bullet lead analysis (CBLA), bloodstain pattern 
analysis (BPA), psychiatry, forensic odontology, and intoxication testing. 
However, the Article does touch on SBS.  The Article proposes a test 
including a second prong that an accused should be entitled to a new trial 
when subsequent research seriously undermines a technique or theory that 
the prosecution relied on at the prior trial in the sense that the new research 
provides a solid empirical basis for preferring the new theory over the prior.  
To illustrate the application of that prong of the test, the article draws a 
contrast.  On one hand, the article argues that a new trial is warranted when 
a later mtDNA test excludes an accused even though at the earlier trial the 
prosecution introduced a microscopist’s opinion that the accused was the 
likely source of the hair strand discovered at the crime scene.1  For its part, 
 
* Edward L. Barrett, Jr. Professor of Law Emeritus, University of California, Davis, School 
of Law. 
 1  The Symposium Article differentiates between the question of whether the subsequent 
research sufficiently invalidates the prior testimony and the issue of whether at a new trial the 
presentation of the new research is likely to change the outcome of the case.  As Professors 
Findley and Risinger put it, the focus of the article is “a single variable in a multi-variable 
analysis” required to determine whether to grant a new trial.  To gain a new trial, the accused 
must show both that to some extent the new research calls into question the validity of the 
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the microscopic analysis relies on the witness’s subjective judgment; and in 
one of the leading investigations of the reliability of such analysis, half the 
declared matches were false positives.2  The 2002 FBI study found that in 
11% of the studied case in which the microscopist had declared a match, 
mtDNA analysis definitely excluded the suspect.3  Each essential step in 
mtDNA analysis has been validated in much the same way as the essential 
steps in nuclear DNA testing.  Thus, in this situation there is a solid empirical 
basis for concluding that the mtNDA result trumps the microscopist’s 
opinion. 
The Article contrasts that situation with a case in which a 
biomechanical expert contradicts a pathologist’s opinion that the cause of an 
infant’s fatal brain injuries was SBS.  Like a prior 2010 article on SBS4 and 
the discussion of SBS in a treatise,5 the article points out that there are 
significant weaknesses in the case for SBS.  The article notes that 
biomechanical research conducted since the advent of the SBS theory 
presents a serious challenge to SBS.  Nevertheless, the article argues that this 
case is distinguishable from the hair analysis situation.  As previously stated, 
each essential step in mtDNA analysis has been studied and empirically 
validated.  The same cannot be said for the biomechanical case against SBS.  
Some biomechanical experts contend that mere manual shaking of an infant 
cannot generate the forces necessary to cause fatal brain injury.  However, 
rather than relying on empirically validated brain injury thresholds for 
infants, biomechanical experts rely on “estimated” thresholds; they have to 
do so because medical ethics precludes subjecting actual infants to the 
controlled experiments that would be necessary to derive validated 
thresholds.  The biomechanical experiments in question have involved adult 
primates and anthropomorphic models.  In short, the empirical validity of 
mtDNA analysis has been demonstrated more thoroughly than the 
biomechanical critique of SBS. 
In their Response, Professors Keith Findley and Michael Risinger take 
the position that the article understates the extent to which the critique of 
 
prior testimony and some likelihood that at a new trial the introduction could affect the 
outcome.  Footnotes 44-47 of the Symposium Article note that the jurisdictions employ 
varying standards to define the requisite effect of the introduction of the new research.   
 2  PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: 
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS:  ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURE-
COMPARISON METHODS 119 (Sept. 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/defaul
t/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensic_science_report_final.pdf.   
 3  Id. at 121.   
 4  Edward J. Imwinkelried, Shaken Baby Syndrome:  A Genuine Battle of the Science 
(And Non-Scientific) Experts, 46 CRIM. L. BULL. 156 (Jan.-Feb. 2010) [hereinafter Battle]. 
 5  2 PAUL C. GIANNELLI, EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, ANDREA ROTH & JANE CAMPBELL 
MORIARTY, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 19.05[a] (5th ed. 2012 & 2017 Supp.) [hereinafter 
GIANNELLI]. 
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SBS calls the validity of the SBS theory into question.  They state that I was 
misled by the writings of some of the strongest proponents of SBS, Dean 
Joelle Anne Moreno and a former prosecutor, Mr. Brian Holmgren.6  It is 
true that both this article and the 2010 piece conclude that SBS testimony is 
admissible.  (For that matter, Professors Findley and Risinger opine that such 
testimony is “likely admissible.”7)  The extended treatment of SBS in the 
2010 article does not argue that the case for SBS rests on classic scientific 
research in the sense of controlled experiments.  Rather, the article lays out 
a different argument supporting SBS: There are tens of cases in which the 
autopsy of deceased infants revealed fatal brain injuries, and the other 
evidence indicated that there was shaking without striking.  The 2010 article 
and the present article acknowledge that this argument is not scientific in the 
traditional sense8 but contend that nevertheless, these studies support a 
rational inference that shaking can cause fatal brain injuries to 
infants.Professors Findley and Risinger dismiss this argument as “a thin reed 
indeed” and argue that the Symposium Article ought to conclude that the 
critique has so seriously undermined the SBS theory that a new trial should 
be awarded. 
Professors Findley and Risinger’s Response places me in a curious 
position.  As previously stated, they claim that in general I am too supportive 
of SBS and more specifically that I have been misled by the writings of Dean 
Moreno and her coauthor, Mr. Holmgren.  Ironically, those claims would 
come as a surprise to Dean Joelle Moreno and Brian Holmgren.  The 
Response cites one of Dean Moreno’s articles.9  Dean Moreno and Mr. 
Holmgren have written two substantial pieces on the subject.  In those 
articles, Dean Moreno and Mr. Holmgren characterize me as one of the 
“small” group of academics who “vocal[ly]” advance the “specious” claim 
that the SBS theory may be “junk science.”10  Indeed, Professor Findley and 
 
 6  Keith A. Findley & D. Michael Risinger, The Science and Law Underlying Post-
Conviction Challenges to Shaken Baby Syndrome Convictions: A Response to Professor 
Imwinkelried, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1209, n.24. 
 7  Id. at n.45.   
 8  The 2010 Article explicitly refers to the reliance on case studies as “non-scientific.”  
Battle, supra note 4.  See also Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Meaning of “Appropriate 
Validation” in Daubert—Interpreted in Light of the Broader Rationalist Tradition, not the 
Narrow Scientific Tradition, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 735 (2003).   
 9  Findley & Risinger, supra note 6, at n.14 (citing Joelle Anne Moreno  & Brian 
Holmgren, The Supreme Court Screws Up the Science:  There Is No Abusive Head 
Trauma/Shaken Baby Syndrome Scientific Controversy, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1357 [hereinafter 
The Supreme Court].  See also Joelle Anne Moreno, Extralegal Supreme Court Policy-
Making, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 451, 513–14 (2015).  
 10  The Supreme Court, supra note 9, at 1373; Joelle Anne Moreno & Brian Holmgren, 
Dissent Into Confusion: The Supreme Court, Denialism, and the False “Scientific” 
Controversy Over Shaken Baby Syndrome, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 153, 158–59 [hereinafter 
Dissent].   
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I are mentioned in the same breath—that is, the same footnotes in the two 
articles—as leading critics of SBS.  The upshot is that both the strong 
proponents of SBS and its strong opponents take issue with my position.  
However, that is understandable. 
A. Support for SBS 
It is expectable that Dean Moreno and Mr. Holmgren think that I am 
insufficiently supportive of SBS.  The titles of their two articles assert their 
belief that there is no legitimate controversy over the validity of SBS; one 
refers to “the False ‘Scientific’ Controversy Over Shaken Baby Syndrome”11 
while the other flatly asserts that “There Is No Abusive Head Trauma/
Shaken Baby Syndrome ‘Scientific’ Controversy.”12  In contrast, the title of 
the 2010 article refers to “A Genuine Battle of the Scientific (and Non-
Scientific) Experts.”13  Moreover,  in treatise, I wrote that the courts should 
approach SBS testimony  with “wariness.”14  Both the 2010 article and this 
Symposium Article contend that SBS’ reliance on case reports raises 
common sense doubts about the validity of the theory: 
 
[I]t is questionable to accept these [case] reports at face value.  
[T]he caregiver could easily be traumatized by the event; and as a 
consequence, he or she might experience amnesia or “defensive 
forgetting” of any impact.  A loving parent’s recollection of their 
child’s head accidentally striking an object or wall might be a 
painful memory that the parent would want to repress.  On the 
alternative assumption that the caregiver acted in bad faith, in 
order to minimize her culpability the caregiver might deliberately 
withhold the detail that they struck the child’s head against an 
object or surface.15 
 
I also agree with Professors Findley and Risinger that there is credible 
evidence that symptoms such as severe retinal hemorrhages in infants are not 
pathognomonic for head trauma; there can be other causes.16  In sum, my 
position is that it is inaccurate to claim that it is as settled as Dean Moreno 
 
 11  Dissent, supra note 10. 
 12  The Supreme Court, supra note 9. 
 13  Battle, supra note 4. 
 14  GIANNELLI, supra note 5, at 249, § 19.05[a].   
 15  Battle, supra note 4, at 174.  In fact, both of Dean Moreno’s articles recognize the risk 
that an accused who acted in bad faith would withhold relevant details from the authorities.  
Supreme Court, supra note 9, at 1424; Dissent, supra note 10, at 216.   
 16   Mark J. Shuman & Kenneth D. Hutchins, Severe Retinal Hemorrhages with 
Reinoschisis in Infants Are Not Pathognomonic for Abusive Head Trauma, 62 J. FORENSIC 
SCI. 807 (2017).   
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and Mr. Holmgren make it out to be that without a striking, merely shaking 
an infant can cause fatal brain injury. 
B. Opposition to SBS 
However, I can also understand why Professors Findley and Risinger 
find my position unsatisfactory.  They do not cast their position as 
categorically as Dean Moreno and Mr. Holmgren do.  In particular, 
Professors Findley and Risinger do not assert that it is clearly settled that 
SBS is junk science.  However, they state their position forcefully.  For 
example, they claim that the recent research has “indisputably debunk[ed]” 
many of the propositions previously advanced by SBS proponents.  They 
draw on published articles by authors such as Doctors Faris A. Bandak17 and 
Patrick Barnes.18  They acknowledge that the recent biomechanical research 
has involved primates and models and concede that biomechanical experts 
rely on “estimated” brain injury thresholds for infants.  However, they 
counter that those facts “would only invalidate the findings of the 
biomechanical research if those estimates—based on extrapolation from 
known injury thresholds for adults, cadaver studies, animal studies, and 
computer modeling—were off by many orders of magnitude, which is highly 
unlikely.”19 
I largely agree with the individual points made by Professors Findley 
and Risinger.  However, the case for the validity of the critique of SBS is 
still weaker than the extent of the validation of mtDNA—the contrast made 
in the Symposium Article.  It is certainly permissible for an expert to rely on 
sensible extrapolation in his or her analysis.20  Furthermore, in this setting 
the extrapolations are highly plausible.  But the bottom line is that 
plausibility does not equate with proof.  The plausibility of a hypothesis 
makes it a good candidate for an empirical test, but it is not a substitute for 
the test.  Unfortunately, in this context medical ethics bar any test to directly 
determine infant’s brain injury threshold. 
The article by Dr. Bandak cited by Professors Findley and Risinger is 
frequently invoked by the biomechanical critics of SBS.  However, that 
article has been criticized.  As Dean Moreno and Mr. Holmgren have noted, 
 
[B]iomechanics experts have published articles critiquing Dr. 
Bandak’s conclusions.  In 2006, Dr. Susan Margulies of the 
University of Pennsylvania Department of Engineering, along 
with seven other biomechanical engineers, discovered that Dr. 
 
 17  Findley & Risinger, supra note 6, at 1216 n.27.  
 18  Findley & Risinger, supra note 6, at 1212, 1217 nn.10 & 30.   
 19  Findley & Risinger, supra note 6, at 1216 n.26.   
 20  Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).   
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Bandak had made significant errors in his mathematical 
calculations which led her to express “grave[] concern[s] that the 
conclusion reached by Bandak may be invalid due to apparent 
numerical errors in his estimation of forces.”  When Dr. Margulies 
repeated Dr. Bandak’s calculations, not only was she unable to 
replicate his findings, but she found “values of neck forces that 
are actually more than 10 times lower than those [calculated by 
Dr. Bandak].”  Dr. Margulies found that Dr. Bandak had used 
“flawed calculations” to “erroneously conclude[] that the neck 
forces in even the least severe shaking event far exceed the 
published injury tolerances of the infant neck.”  According to Dr. 
Margulies, “when accurately calculated, the range of neck forces 
is considerably lower, and includes values that are far below the 
threshold of injury” calculated by Bandak.21 
 
Dean Moreno and Mr. Holmgrem add that two of the coauthors of Dr. 
Margulies’ article were authorities whom Dr. Bandak cited in his paper.22  In 
short, opposition to SBS among biomechanical engineers is not monolithic. 
For that matter, in an article written last year, Dr. Barnes, another 
authority cited by Professors Findley and Risinger,  made it clear that he is 
“not one who says shaking can’t cause the triad” at the heart of SBS—
subdural hemorrhage, retinal hemorrhage, and brain injury.23  To be sure, he 
disagrees with experts who previously “march[ed] in lockstep”24 and 
testified in absolutist terms that shaking not only could cause fatal brain 
injury but went to the length of declaring that the triad of symptoms was 
“pathognomonic of SBS.”25  However, he uses the adjective “unsettled” to 
describe the state of the research about the “SBS versus impact trauma” 
question.26 
I confess that I am probably uncommonly concerned about the 
uncertainty in expert analysis.  Shortly after the rendition of the Daubert 
decision, I wrote a piece about the implications of the decision.27  The article 
recognizes the importance of the Court’s formal holdings that the enactment 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence impliedly superseded the Frye general 
 
 21  Supreme Court, supra 9, at 1385–86. 
 22  Supreme Court, supra 9, at 1386. 
 23  Patrick Barnes, Child Abuse—Nonaccidental Injury (NAI) and Abuse Head Trauma 
(AHT)—Medical Imaging:  Issues and Controversies in the Era of Evidence-Based Medicine, 
50 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 679, 687 (2017). 
 24  Id. at 685. 
 25  Id. at 679.   
 26  Id. at 686. 
 27  Edward J. Imwinkelried, Evidence Law Visits Jurassic Park:  The Far-Reaching 
Implications of the Daubert Court’s Recognition of the Uncertainty of the Scientific 
Enterprise, 81 IOWA L. REV. 55 (1995).   
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acceptance test and that the reference to “scientific knowledge” in Rule 702 
prescribes a new reliability/validation test.  However, I wrote then—and still 
believe—that the most important passage in Daubert is the Court’s explicit 
acknowledgment of the uncertainty in scientific analysis: “arguably, there 
are no certainties in science.”28  No matter how many experimental tests 
appear to confirm a hypothesis, one can always conceive of another test; and 
so long as that is true, there is a possibility of subsequent falsification of the 
hypothesis.  More recently, I have written about the uncertainty of seemingly 
precise scientific measurements—such as the measurements that 
biomechanical experts make. 29  Metrology is the science of measurement.  
The fundamental tenet of metrology is that one can never be certain that he 
or she has captured the true value of the measurand.30  No matter how 
scrupulously the analyst conducts the measurement and no matter how 
carefully the measuring instrument has been calibrated, there is always 
uncertainty in the most exacting scientific measurement. 
It is especially appropriate to acknowledge the considerable uncertainty 
surrounding SBS.  In the United Kingdom, the Royal Society and the Royal 
Society of Edinburgh have teamed to prepare a series of primers on scientific 
issues for the judges in their countries.  They have already issued primers on 
DNA typing and another on so-called gait analysis, the theory that a 
computer can identify a walker depicted in a video by studying the nuances 
of their movements.  The primer on gait analysis informs the judges that 
“there is a lack of credible research” to validate the theory.31  However, 
despite a request by judges for a primer on SBS, to date the societies have 
not issued a primer on that topic.  A board commissions the primers.  His 
Honor Mark Wall, QC, is the representative of criminal judges on the board.  
Judge Wall explained the societies’ failure to release a primer on SBS: The 
gist of his explanation is that “there is as yet no consensus.  The science was 
and still is far from settled.”  That assessment is accurate.  That assessment 
confirms that the criticisms of SBS, including the biomechanical research, 
have not undermined SBS as seriously as mtDNA analysis has undercut 
microscopic hair analysis. 
 
 28   Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993).   
 29  Ted Vosk & Edward J. Imwinkelried, Forensic Science:  Measurements in Forensic 
Science—of Errors and Uncertainty, 53 CRIM. L. BULL. 532 (2017); Edward Imwinkelried, 
The Importance of Forensic Metrology in Preventing Miscarriages of Justice:  Intellectual 
Honesty About the Uncertainty of Measurement in Scientific Analysis, 7 J. MARSHALL L.J. 
333 (2014).   
 30  See generally TED VOSK & ASHLEY F. EMERY, FORENSIC METROLOGY: SCIENTIFIC 
MEASUREMENT AND INFERENCE FOR LAWYERS, JUDGES AND CRIMINALISTS (2015). 
 31  Pallab Ghosh, UK Judges to Get Scientific Guides, BBC (Nov. 27, 2017), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-42057009.   
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C. The Macrocosm Issue: The Standard for Granting New Trials 
The Symposium Article proposes a two-pronged standard for 
determining whether the subsequent analysis has invalidated the prior theory 
to the extent that a new trial is warranted.32  As previously stated, the second 
prong is that the new analysis seriously undermines the prior theory in the 
sense that it provides a solid empirical basis for preferring the new theory 
over the prior theory.  As an illustrative case, the article poses a hypothetical 
case in which an mtDNA analysis excludes a person whom a microscopist 
testifies might well be the source of a hair strand.  The other, initial prong of 
the proposed test is that the new analysis utterly discredits the prior theory.  
The Article uses CBLA to illustrate that prong.33  At one time FBI experts 
testified that based on a comparative elemental analysis of a crime scene 
bullet and a bullet associated with the accused, they could determine whether 
the two bullets came from the same batch, that is, a single day’s production 
at a bullet manufacturing plant.  An essential assumption of CBLA analysis 
was that the elemental composition of each batch is both uniform and unique.  
However, after FBI experts had repeatedly testified on the basis of CBLA, 
William Tobin began to question that assumption.  When he reviewed the 
production data from bullet manufacturers, he discovered that the 
assumption was false:  There were often variations within each batch, and 
sometimes the elemental composition of different batches matched.34  This 
situation is a step beyond the mtDNA case.  In that case, the mtDNA analysis 
does not directly contradict an essential assumption of microscopic hair 
analysis; rather, the mtDNA analysis yields an inconsistent result, and the 
mtDNA analysis trumps because the thoroughgoing validation of mtDNA 
provides a solid empirical basis for preferring the mtDNA result.  Tobin’s 
analysis directly invalidated an essential assumption of CBLA. 
The original article proposes the two-pronged test as the standard 
because both prongs are judicially manageable and consistent with a 
commitment to empiricism.  The question posed by the Response is whether 
we should go farther.  The Response argues in favor of doing so by endorsing 
the standard adopted by the intermediate Wisconsin appellate court in State 
v. Edmonds.35  There the court announced that “the emergence of a legitimate 
 
 32  Again, to use Professors Findley and Risinger’s terminology, that is the proposal for 
one “variable in a multi-variable analysis” to determine whether to award a new trial.  Another 
variable is the effect that the introduction of the new evidence would likely have had to the 
prior verdict.  See supra note 1.   
 33  In most cases, firearms experts rely on a comparative analysis of the striations on the 
two bullets.  However, in some cases the crime scene bullet is too deformed to permit that 
type of analysis. 
 34  William A. Tobin & Edward J. Imwinkelried, Comparative Bullet Lead Analysis 
(CBLA) Evidence: Valid Inference or Ipse Dixit?, 28 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 43 (2003).   
 35  746 N.W.2d 590 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008). 
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and significant dispute within the medical community” over SBS constitutes 
newly discovered evidence justifying a new trial.36 A number of cases 
embrace a similar standard.37  Professors Findley and Risinger state that the 
Symposium Article does not ascribe sufficient “significance” to the “shifts 
in the scientific and medical understandings underlying the SBS/AHT 
hypothesis.” 
In fact, such shifts can have a four-fold significance.  First, at the 
original trial they can provide the defense with a powerful argument for 
summation.  The thrust of the argument would be that there is reasonable 
doubt because, using a different theory, another qualified expert came to a 
different conclusion than the prosecution expert.38  The defense attorney 
might argue: 
 
Ladies and gentlemen, her Honor will instruct you that you cannot 
find Mr. Welsh guilty unless you are convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt that he shook his child and that that shaking 
caused his child’s brain injuries.  There’s obviously reasonable 
doubt in this case.  You heard two experts with impressive 
credentials give diametrically opposed opinions about causation.  
One says Yes.  The other says No.  Our witness, Dr. Vanucci, 
explained that while at one time many experts agreed with the 
shaken baby theory, today many experts, including her, reject it.  
Even the scientists can’t agree.  Ladies and gentlemen, none of us 
is a scientist.  I know I’m not.  During jury selection, you all to me 
that you don’t have a scientific background.  If the scientists can’t 
agree among themselves, how in the world can lay people—
regular folks like us—decide the scientific issue and conclude that 
there was causation? 
 
If even a single juror found that argument convincing, the argument could 
prevent the return of a guilty verdict. 
Second, especially in a Frye jurisdiction, the shift would presumably 
raise grave doubts in a court’s mind about the reliability of any verdict based 
on SBS.  The most popular rationale for the Frye test is that lay jurors lack 
the background and critical acumen to resolve a true battle of the experts.39  
Positing that rationale, the courts reasoned that proof of general acceptance 
 
 36  Id. at 599.   
 37  E.g., People v. Bailey, 999 N.Y.S.2d 713 (App. Term 2014) (noting a sea change in 
medical thinking).   
 38  EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE METHODS OF ATTACKING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 13-
4 (5th ed. 2014).   
 39  See People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244–45 (Cal. 1976); People v. Barney, 10 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 731 (Ct. App. 1992); People v. Barbara, 255 N.W.2d 171, 194 (Mich. 1977); Grady 
v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 839 A.2d 1038, 1045 (Pa. 2003). 
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would be the best proxy or surrogate for a direct inquiry into the scientific 
merit of the technique or theory.40  If that is the case and subsequent research 
generally erodes the scientific community’s faith in the validity of a theory 
that a prior conviction rests on, the court ought to be concerned that the prior 
conviction represented a miscarriage of justice.  At one time, Frye was the 
overwhelming majority view in the United States.41 
Thirdly and most importantly, in a Frye jurisdiction a marked shift in 
sentiment in the relevant scientific communities can have a critical impact 
on the admissibility analysis.  If the admissibility test is general acceptance 
and the shift has reduced the support for the theory below the general 
acceptance level, the prosecution testimony about the theory will not even 
be admissible at a retrial. 
Fourth and finally, if that prosecution testimony is necessary evidence 
on an essential element of the charged crime—such as causation in a 
prosecution for an infant’s murder—the prosecution will not even have 
enough evidence to survive a motion for a directed verdict.  The exclusion 
of the evidence under Frye will render the prosecution case legally 
insufficient to sustain the government’s initial burden of production or going 
forward. 
Given the third and fourth dimensions of the significance of the shift, it 
becomes clear that the Edmonds test is the Frye-era equivalent of the first 
prong of the test proposed by the Symposium Article for the Daubert era.  
Most jurisdictions have moved away from Frye toward some version of a 
Daubert-style reliability test.42  Under Frye, proof of a significant shift in 
sentiment directly negates an essential foundational requirement for the 
admissibility of the testimony, namely, proof of general acceptance.  In the 
Daubert era, as in the CBLA example, proof of subsequent research utterly 
discrediting an essential assumption of the prior theory directly negates an 
empirical requirement for a satisfactory foundation. 
It made eminently good sense in the Frye era to treat a showing of a 
significant shift in expert sentiment—standing alone—as an adequate basis 
for granting a new trial.  It is less clear that that standard is well suited for 
the Daubert era.  After the panel at Professor Risinger’s Symposium, there 
was a question-and-answer period.  One of the attendees asked why the 
Symposium Article criticized the new California legislation on shifted 
science.  The amended California statute, Penal Code § 1473, authorizes new 
trial relief whenever the prosecution witness at the prior trial later 
 
 40  Bert Black, Francisco J. Ayala & Carol Saffran-Brinks, Science and the Law in the 
Wake of Daubert: A New Search for Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REV. 715, 722–35 
(1994).   
 41  GIANNELLI, supra note 5, § 1.06.   
 42  GIANNELLI, supra note 5, §§ 1.08-1.10.  
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“repudiate[s]” his or her opinion.  The Symposium Article remarks: 
 
It is . . . wrong-minded to treat an expert’s repudiation of prior 
testimony as an adequate basis for postconviction relief.  No 
expert schooled in the empirical tradition would accept a 
scientist’s change of mind without inquiring why the scientist has 
adopted a new view.  In Daubert, Justice Blackmun stated that 
reliable “knowledge” “connotes more than subjective relief . . . .”  
At the original trial [if Daubert governed], the judge should never 
have admitted the expert’s opinion if it amounted to nothing more 
than the expert’s subjective opinion.  By the same token, at the 
later postconviction relief proceeding, the judge should not accept 
the expert’s repudiation of the earlier opinion [as an adequate 
justification for granting a new trial] if the repudation amounts to 
nothing more than a subjective change of mind. 
 
The courts arguably should treat evidence of a change in the scientific 
community’s collective sentiment in the same fashion.  Under Daubert, the 
extent of the acceptance is only one of the factors that the judge considers in 
evaluating the sufficiency of the showing of the reliability of a technique or 
theory.43  If the judge takes the empirical tradition seriously, standing alone 
proof of the popularity of a technique or theory should not guarantee the 
admissibility of testimony based on the technique or theory.  The judge ought 
to inquire why the technique or theory enjoys that popularity: Is there 
empirical data warranting that level of popularity?  The parallel reasoning 
would be that without more, a change in the expert community’s collective 
sentiment does not mandate a new trial.  Here too the judge should ask why 
the sentiment has shifted.  Can the defense point to new scientific research 
or further accumulated experience that accounts for the shift and answers the 
why question.  Adding an empirical component to the inquiry provides 
greater assurance that on the specific facts of the case, the policy of 
overturning potentially wrongful convictions outweighs the legitimate public 
interest upholding finality of judgment.  Under Daubert, the expert’s ipse 
dixit does not suffice.44  Neither should the ipse dixit of the scientific 
community.  Its collective sentiment was dispositive under Frye, but that is 
no longer true in federal practice and most states. 
In their Response, Professors Findley and Risinger are not content to 
prove that there has been a shift in the sentiment in the scientific community 
regarding SBS.  If a shift in sentiment automatically warranted a new trial, 
they could have radically shortened the Response by citing only the survey 
 
 43  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993). 
 44  Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).  
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described in footnote 23: “two surveys of pathologists found that 35% to 
nearly 60% of forensic pathologists in 2010 and 2015 respectively question 
the SBS ‘diagnosis.’’  Instead, they marshaled a wealth of empirical studies 
that yielded findings inconsistent with the SBS theory.  Whether by design 
or accident, they strove to establish both the occurrence of the shift in 
medical sentiment and the empirical data prompting the shift.  In effect, they 
addressed the why question. 
CONCLUSION 
In their Response, Professors Findley and Risinger criticize the 
Symposium Article for failing to sufficiently explore the significance of 
shifts in scientific sentiment.  That criticism is justified.  The Response has 
prompted me to consider that issue further.  As we have seen, a shift can be 
significant in four different respects.  It can not only affect the weight of the 
prosecution testimony.  In addition, particularly in Frye jurisdictions, a 
marked shift can impact the court’s view of the reliability, admissibility, and 
legal sufficiency of the prosecution testimony.  As previously stated, the 
Edmonds standard was ideally suited for the Frye era; a significant shift 
could directly negate general acceptance and render the prosecution 
testimony inadmissible as well as legally insufficient.  The question that now 
presents itself is whether we should update the standard for an era in which 
most jurisdictions adhere to some variation of the Daubert standard. 
In closing, I would like to thank Professors Findley and Risinger—as 
well as Dean Moreno and Mr. Holmgren.  In his concurrence in Daubert, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist voiced the concern that the new validation standard 
would push federal judges out of their comfort zone and force them to 
become amateur scientists.45  More broadly, Daubert posed a challenge to 
judges, attorneys, and Evidence scholars:  Would they be willing to stop 
“hiding from science,” roll up their sleeves, and deeply immerse themselves 
in the empirical data and methodologies that they needed to understand to 
make Daubert “work”?  Professor Findley, Professor Risinger, Dean 
Moreno, and Mr. Holmgren have done precisely that.  It is true that they have 
not resolved the controversy over SBS.  However, thanks to their efforts, we 
have a much more sophisticated and nuanced understanding of the various 
aspects of the controversy.46  Their example gives us reason to be hopeful 
 
 45  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 598–99 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 46  The Symposium Article deals with only the admissibility of testimony about SBS and 
post-conviction claims that a new trial should be granted because the trial judge erred in 
admitting the testimony.  The Article does not discuss the question of whether, standing alone, 
SBS testimony is legally sufficient to support a judgment of conviction.  See RANDY PAPETTI, 
THE FORENSIC UNRELIABILITY OF THE SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME 195,  257, 308–09 
(2018); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Legal Sufficiency Analysis of Genuine Battles of the 
Experts in Criminal Trials:  The Unrealized Potential of the Supreme Court’s Landmark 
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about the Daubert era. 
 
 
Decision in Jackson v. Virginia, 54 CRIM. L. BULL. (forthcoming 2018).  
